Fear and Paralysis on Syria

Many bad outcomes could follow the downfall of the Assad regime, but good US policy, while cognizant of these risks, should not be paralyzed by them.  The Obama Administration’s policy is best understood as inaction through internationalization, results from its fear of taking on any risk.  This has allowed Syria to devolve into a greater source of regional instability, and enhanced the threat to US interests while ignoring the opportunities. 

Instead of cautiously undertaking steps to develop relationships with the opposition and provide direct support as a way to influence those groups, the administration chose what it believed was a risk-free, exclusively political path through the UN.  Most analysts understood that Russia, China and Assad himself would not cooperate with this approach to any meaningful degree.  However, the administration used the process for political cover and happily pointed its finger at those not willing to sign on to meaningful action.  Just as it has blamed President Bush for the country’s economic ills, Obama’s Syria blame-game has run its course as the conflict spins completely out of control.

Even as it seems likely that the administration will finally take a more direct role in facilitating Assad’s ouster, delays and uncertainty continue.  A Daily Star article from this week reports that a Presidential Directive to provide support to the opposition has “been on Donilon's (National Security Advisor) desk for quite some time without further action.”  The article goes on to refer to Obama’s policy on Syria as an ‘odyssey’ and quotes a variety of inside sources that paint a picture of deep uncertainty on Syria policy.

This deterioration in Syria, obvious for some time, has been well documented this week too.  The New York Times reported that the conflict evolved from a “protest movement” into “an armed battle in response to the government’s use of overwhelming lethal force”.  This created “a draw for jihadists”.  Analysts that the Times spoke with believe that the first suicide bombings perpetrated by outside jihadist groups (Al Qaeda among them) only began last December.  A Wall Street Journal piece goes into more details on Al Qaeda’s infiltration and infrastructure in Syria noting that they have “appointed a management council, set up a headquarters and created regional networks with military and religious leaders to run operations, manage cross-border activity, and procure weapons and other supplies.” 

As the US abdicated leadership on this critical security issue in favor of gaining political cover beneath a UN process that leads to nowhere, Al Qaeda has established itself for a long-term presence in Syria.  The Obama Administration’s desire to avoid difficult choices and to keep any risk at arm’s length has led to the exact bad outcomes that paralyzed them in the first place.

NY Times Article here

WSJ piece here

Daily Star article here

Failure to Lead

A crisis in leadership in Washington defines this election season.  The last 4 years have seen a complete abandonment of ownership in favor of ‘the other guys caused it’ and ‘we inherited this mess’.  Deflection may serve a purpose through a few news cycles, but when contrasted to the kinds of characteristics Americans want from their next President it’s a losing proposition.  Highlighting this President's poor record in foreign policy reinforces a message of failed leadership, and there are plenty of failures to point out.

• Obama pulled US troops completely out of Iraq leaving behind a deteriorating security situation and a  growing political vacuum the Iranians are happily exploiting.

• This President never made a complete commitment in Afghanistan.  He didn't provide the troop numbers recommended by the military to effectively implement the counter-insurgency strategy that President Obama himself had selected.  He never made the ongoing commitment to maintain domestic political interest or support for the effort either - presumably to ease his way towards an Iraq style exit.

• Syria has shelled and slaughtered its citizens for more than a year, and the US has yet to accomplish much more than delivering verbal warnings and holding press conferences.  Feel the earnestness in these statements from Friday: NY Times Story 

• Iran has moved rapidly towards a nuclear capability while US policy has remained stubbornly focused on engagement.  The declared payoff to this approach was international unity, but this has yet to alter Iranian behavior and has shown signs of completely unraveling.  The Russians have now openly declared their intent to use engagement with Iran to isolate and contain Israel. 

So much for raising international consensus - forged in the bright halls of international institutions - above more direct pursuits of national interest.  This Administration made decision after decision that abdicated US leadership and commitment on critical issues around the globe.  Even in the one example when it asserted itself and assembled a coalition through NATO to oust Gadhafi, it did so under the notion of ‘leading from behind.’  Many administrations have adopted these pithy phrases to tidily sum up new policies without actually committing to anything meaningful, but this non sequitur reaches a new and hopefully absolute low in the practice.

Obviously this election will focus primarily on this Administration’s failed economic policies, but elections have broader themes and narratives that ultimately define the candidates and the outcome.  Making leadership that central theme will underscore this Administration’s failures both at home and around the globe.  

Rational

Lots of talk about General Dempsey’s remarks last weekend referring to Iran as a “rational actor”.  Clearly the phrase was deployed to win support for the endless rounds of EU and US negotiations with Iran.  After all, the Chairman’s opinions are unimpeachable and non-political.  And if Iran is deemed rational then one can readily conclude that negotiations are viable, right?

Here is the WSJ’s take on it;

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203358704577235421949357032.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

and Michael Singh at FP unpacks the idea of rationality;

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/23/is_the_iranian_regime_rational

Arguing this issue is largely an academic exercise as Iran's byzantine governmental structures and fluid political environment make the question almost meaningless for US policy.  Rationality is subjective, and the regime’s unstable grip on power and weakening legitimacy can make for rational choices that lead to undesirable outcomes for the U.S.  For example, would the regime act rationally in the face of a Syria-like uprising?  How does Iranian behavior change under that scenario once Tehran enjoys the protective umbrealla offered by nuclear deterrence?  

Here is more evidence of rational behavior.  Despite international isolation, a European oil embargo, and proscription from the international financial system, Iran has recently increased its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium by 50%.  Maybe this is a rational reaction to Israeli bellicosity, but it definitely underscores the distinction between an academic exercise and the demands of implementing real world policy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-sees-spike-in-irans-uranium-production/2012/02/24/gIQAnc83XR_story.html?hpid=z1

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Update, 9/2/12
Krauthammer wrote on deterrence recently or, as Kramer might describe it, "rationality's ugly cousin".   He takes on the argument that because deterrence worked with the Soviet Union through the Cold War it will, therefore, work with Iran.  He rightly sites the primary differences as ideological and geographical, and concludes that  "the mullahs have a radically different worldview, a radically different grievance and a radically different calculation of the consequences of nuclear war."  I accept each of these arguments, but the geographic one is most chilling.  The possibility of a successful first-strike, with only a limited response, deeply undermines some of the basic logic that drove Cold War deterrence.  In terms of making a persuasive case against any policy of containment, this geographic reality makes the most powerful argument.    

Another piece in FA, Deterrence Lessons from Iraq, details why Saddam Hussein proved so difficult to contain and deter.  Ultimately, Saddam proved an extremely poor judge of risk and he ignored inconvenient information.  This underscores the subjective nature of rationality.  Saddam proved "extremely hard, occasionally even impossible, to deter, but for reasons that have little to do with irrationality."  

Together these two pieces paint a picture of rationality and deterrence more nuanced and relevant to Iran than the 'it worked in the Cold War' argument.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-deterrence-works-fantasy/2012/08/30/20c0a3ea-f2d8-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61701/kevin-woods-james-lacey-and-williamson-murray/saddams-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside

How Much Time for Iran?

Matthew Koenig wrote a compelling article in Foreign Affairs outlining the arguments in favor of military action against the Iran nuclear program.  He restates a valid argument that has been clear to many Iran watchers for quite some time.  However, his comments regarding the underground enrichment facility near Qom got my attention.  He states that this facility ‘represents a more challenging target’ because it is built into a mountain, and well defended against attack.  Despite this, he argues that the US does not need to destroy it in order to achieve the purposes of significantly retarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.  He reaches this conclusion based on the current presumption that the Qom facility “contains little nuclear material” and, therefore, does not yet represent a significant facility.
More to the point, the Wall Street Journal on Friday reported the Pentagon’s acknowledgment of this shortcoming of U.S. ordinance against heavily fortified underground facilities.  Meanwhile, Iran announced in early January that enrichment activities had commenced at the Qom facility, which has a reported capacity of 3,000 centrifuges – or enough to produce material for 1 to 2 nuclear weapons per year.  

Collectively, these reported facts indicate that Iran is entering (or very close to entering) a window of time when it can enrich uranium and advance its pursuit of nuclear weapons while the U.S. cannot meaningfully threaten or undertake effective military action to stop it.  Ineffective U.S. policy, and an unwillingness by political leadership to make difficult decisions, has led us to this extremely dangerous period.

REFS:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran

Wall Street Journal

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b0f57898-3acb-11e1-a756-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kmUJLKu3

To negotiate or not to...

After attempting to increase tensions with the West and in the region by conducting Naval exercises and making bellicose threats to close the Straight of Hormuz, Iran has now offered to reengage the international community in negotiations over its nuclear program.  Entering negotiations would not only be ineffective in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but also play into Tehran’s hands. 

Some view this latest offer as the result of effective international sanctions that shaped Iran’s behavior and forced them to the table.  Based on news reports, existing sanctions seem to have the desired effect on the Iranian economy, and the threat of an oil embargo and financial sanctions by Europe and the US will further hurt the Iranian economy.  However, this offer should be considered a shrewd political maneuver to create a patina of compromise and cooperation as the regime enters what may prove to be a very dangerous few months.  

In March, Iran will hold its first country wide elections since the 2009 Presidential election and the subsequent crackdown.  The first anniversary of the Arab Spring and likely ongoing violence in Syria will serve as a backdrop to an election process that will omit dissenting voices, and be anything but free, fair and open.  The world will watch those elections closely, and Tehran is preparing to manage the global reaction to any political dissent and subsequent violence. 

Iran likely calculates that the existence of negotiations with the West will free their hands to respond more forcefully and decisively to any unrest.  In the past, Western governments have demonstrated an unwillingness to pursue sanctions or meaningful responses to even unconnected Iranian behavior when nuclear deal making is afoot.  The 2009 crackdown after the Iranian Presidential election is a case in point.  The Obama Administration remained quiet in the face of regime violence largely to avoid angering Tehran in the slim hope that engagement could settle the nuclear issue.   

Regardless of Iran’s true intentions, one thing is clear; they are not yet prepared to seriously negotiate over their nuclear program.  Their statement underscores this point by declaring the absence of “preconditions from the Iranian side”.  In diplomatic terms this cuts both ways, and announces Iranian unwillingness to accept any preconditions proposed by the West; preconditions such as ceasing enrichment activities.  If Iran were seriously intent on reaching an agreement, then preconditions, particularly those targeted on the fuel cycle, would not be so jealously guarded and declared from the outset.

The result is negotiations that would stop the imposition of new and more effective sanctions, undermine a meaningful response to a likely regime crackdown against domestic political dissent, all the while achieving no agreement that would slow or stop Iran’s nuclear program.  This would be a blow to the United States’ ability to lead effective and decisive international actions to achieve either regime change or eliminate the Iran nuclear program. 
 
REFS:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/report-iran-to-propose-new-round-of-nuclear-talks-with-six-world-powers/2011/12/31/gIQANOIxRP_story.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/world/middleeast/iran-asks-to-resume-talks-on-its-nuclear-program.html