Lots of talk about General Dempsey’s remarks last weekend referring to Iran Iran Iran
Here is the WSJ’s take on it;
and Michael Singh at FP unpacks the idea of rationality;
Arguing this issue is largely an academic exercise as Iran's byzantine governmental structures and fluid political environment make the question almost meaningless for US
Here is more evidence of rational behavior. Despite international isolation, a European oil embargo, and proscription from the international financial system, Iran has recently increased its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium by 50%. Maybe this is a rational reaction to Israeli bellicosity, but it definitely underscores the distinction between an academic exercise and the demands of implementing real world policy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-sees-spike-in-irans-uranium-production/2012/02/24/gIQAnc83XR_story.html?hpid=z1
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Update, 9/2/12
Krauthammer wrote on deterrence recently or, as Kramer might describe it, "rationality's ugly cousin". He takes on the argument that because deterrence worked with the Soviet Union through the Cold War it will, therefore, work with Iran. He rightly sites the primary differences as ideological and geographical, and concludes that "the mullahs have a radically different worldview, a
radically different grievance and a radically different calculation of the
consequences of nuclear war." I accept each of these arguments, but the geographic one is most chilling. The possibility of a successful first-strike, with only a limited response, deeply undermines some of the basic logic that drove Cold War deterrence. In terms of making a persuasive case against any policy of containment, this geographic reality makes the most powerful argument.
Another piece in FA, Deterrence Lessons from Iraq, details why Saddam Hussein proved so difficult to contain and deter. Ultimately, Saddam proved an extremely poor judge of risk and he ignored inconvenient information. This underscores the subjective nature of rationality. Saddam proved "extremely hard, occasionally even impossible, to deter, but for reasons that have little to do with irrationality."
Together these two pieces paint a picture of rationality and deterrence more nuanced and relevant to Iran than the 'it worked in the Cold War' argument.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-deterrence-works-fantasy/2012/08/30/20c0a3ea-f2d8-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61701/kevin-woods-james-lacey-and-williamson-murray/saddams-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside
Here is more evidence of rational behavior. Despite international isolation, a European oil embargo, and proscription from the international financial system, Iran has recently increased its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium by 50%. Maybe this is a rational reaction to Israeli bellicosity, but it definitely underscores the distinction between an academic exercise and the demands of implementing real world policy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-sees-spike-in-irans-uranium-production/2012/02/24/gIQAnc83XR_story.html?hpid=z1
------------
Update, 9/2/12
Krauthammer wrote on deterrence recently or, as Kramer might describe it, "rationality's ugly cousin". He takes on the argument that because deterrence worked with the Soviet Union through the Cold War it will, therefore, work with Iran. He rightly sites the primary differences as ideological and geographical, and concludes that "the mullahs have a radically different worldview, a
radically different grievance and a radically different calculation of the
consequences of nuclear war." I accept each of these arguments, but the geographic one is most chilling. The possibility of a successful first-strike, with only a limited response, deeply undermines some of the basic logic that drove Cold War deterrence. In terms of making a persuasive case against any policy of containment, this geographic reality makes the most powerful argument. Another piece in FA, Deterrence Lessons from Iraq, details why Saddam Hussein proved so difficult to contain and deter. Ultimately, Saddam proved an extremely poor judge of risk and he ignored inconvenient information. This underscores the subjective nature of rationality. Saddam proved "extremely hard, occasionally even impossible, to deter, but for reasons that have little to do with irrationality."
Together these two pieces paint a picture of rationality and deterrence more nuanced and relevant to Iran than the 'it worked in the Cold War' argument.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-deterrence-works-fantasy/2012/08/30/20c0a3ea-f2d8-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61701/kevin-woods-james-lacey-and-williamson-murray/saddams-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside
